FM 5-102 COUNTERMOBILITY PDF

Mozshura Scatterable mines will be employed against enemy units anywhere on the battlefield. The demolition material required for a prechamber shaft system is stored in a nearby 5-ton bunker complex and is earmarked for the sole use at its designated obstacle site. In the defense, ADM is used to create key obstacles, block dangerous avenues of approach, and deny the enemy use of important installations and facilities. Tactically, the denial of threat countermine actions serves to deprive cuontermobility threat commander of the tactical initiative which his entire operation plan is based. Can mines be buried? There are no fast methods of breaching a belt of posts.

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If the attack fails, engineers must be prepared to conduct rapid fortification and obstacle activity in support of the hasty defense. In this role, POZs will perform as they do in offensive combat and emplace mines in accordance with the overall defensive plan. Protection against counterattack In planning the offensive employment of the command, the threat commander constantly evaluates the battlefield for suitable enemy counterattack areas. Areas identified as favorable are usually those which would detract from the maneuver of the combined arms teams, and be considered vital for mine employment in order to deny the enemy commander tactical initiative.

Engaging in a battle of dispersion and maneuver necessarily creates extensive exposed flanks. In threat theory, preventing enemy exploitation of such a condition relies, on two actions: rapid execution of combat tasks before the enemy can react, and protection of flanks by extensive minefield. During the march to contact and during the engagement itself, POZs actively emplace mines on the flanks of maneuvering units to preclude being attacked by mobile forces of the enemy.

In the late s and early s, the tendency for a POZ to create an obstacle by alternating minefield with other antitank obstacles along a 6- to 7-kilometer front is now considered ineffective, as is the practice of laying long strip minefield without covering them by antitank fire. Current threat teaching stresses the need for anititank guns to engage tanks as soon as they encounter the minefield. Thus, a short, deep mine and gun obstacle belt is preferred to a long, thin one, making choice of position critical.

Because of the possible need to recover minefield as the advance progresses, antipersonnel mines are rarely included in an antitank minefield laid in support of offensive operations. Minefields left behind are clearly marked and recorded, and their locations are reported to the Chief of Engineer Services. In the offense, the commander employs mines in areas evaluated as offering the enemy a significant advantage to interfere with the tactical plan.

Thus, the detection of minelaying activity offers the friendly force an indication of the manner in which the threat command will be employed, and highlights those areas deemed critical to success. The threat, in planning for the widespread employment of mines, fully expects any enemy to engage in extensive mine warfare. Consequently, countermine warfare is an extremely important task entrusted to combat engineers.

Breaching lanes through enemy minefield is critical to the goal of keeping the attack moving. Equally important is the desirability of conducting mine breaching operations covertly, whenever possible, to preserve surprise.

When attacking from the march, the location of enemy minefield is the responsibility of engineer reconnaissance patrols IRDs. In breaching the required number of lanes through the minefield, the OOD will employ several types of mine breaching equipment.

The normal threat method of breaching minefield during an assault or rapid advance is to employ mine plows fitted to the lead tanks.

Although engineers will reconnoiter the minefield, the initial breaching is not primarily an engineer task. Engineers assist in fitting these and plowroller combinations KMT-5s commonly used for minefield reconnaissance. The threat estimates clearing speeds of about 6 kilometers per hour kph for plow-fitted tanks, and about 10 kph for roller-fitted tanks.

Combat vehicles follow these plow-equipped tanks in the breaching of a minefield. This device fires and then detonates an explosive hose line charge across the minefield. It clears a lane about meters long by 6 to 8 meters wide. This equipment is particularly useful during an assault river crossing when there are minefield on the far bank and amphibious vehicles may have to initially operate in the bridgehead without tank support.

Another mine-clearing device is the explosive line charge. It consists of three separate linear charges, a nose section, and a detonator box. Each linear charge may be assembled to any desired length by connecting 2-meter sections together with threaded collars. The light, sheet metal, 5-centimeter-diameter, tubular sections are filled with cast trinitrotoluene TNT explosive at 9 kilograms per linear meter.

The forward end section is fitted with a roller to facilitate insertion of the charge into a minefield. The device is assembled in a rear area, towed by tank to the minefields edge, pushed into the minefield, and fired. The triple line charge will clear a 6-meter-wide path along the entire length of the charge.

A squad can assemble a meter-long triple charge in 1 to 1. Bangalore torpedoes are also used. Sections, 2 meters in length, carrying 6 kilograms of explosive, are connected by collars.

The clearance depth of a path 1 to 2 meters wide is limited only by the manageable weight that can be manually pushed into the minefield. The number of lanes to be cleared depends on the terrain and the number of columns in the assault echelon. For a leading battalion in the assault on a main axis, six to eight lanes may be required, one for each assaulting platoon. In secondary sectors, as few as two lanes may be sufficient. However, an average of four to six lanes can be expected with at least two developed into permanent lanes, 6 to 8 meters wide, for passage of artillery and logistic vehicles.

Engineers mark minefield lanes and provide traffic control through the minefield. The routes leading from a start line to each lane are marked with red triangular metal flags and black-and-white tapes. Illuminating markers may be used at night. Routes through friendly minefield are marked by signs of various shapes placed not less than 20 meters apart on both sides of the route.

If possible, they are positioned so as not to be visible from enemy positions. In attacking from line of march, manual mine breaching is carried out only under certain conditions: As nuisance minefield along or on routes, especially around craters and demolitions, to allow the route clearing unit to work freely.

On approaches to water obstacles and water mines. To maintain surprise, especially at night or when the threat wishes to make a gap in their own minefield. When other mine breaching equipment is committed. When conducting assault breaching operations against a defended enemy minefield, the usual practice is to attack with combined arms teams led by combat engineers and supported by artillery and tactical aviation.

Such a formation is necessary if the combat engineers are not to suffer crippling losses to defensive fires. Artillery, in particular, plays a major role in suppressing defensive fires and allowing the execution of engineer tasks. If artillery support is not available or is too short in duration, the first wave of the attack is led by plow- and roller-equipped tanks, while combat engineers closely follow to widen lanes.

Here again, the use of plow- and roller-equipped tanks is not an engineer responsibility, but an engineer function carried out by tank soldiers. Another means of lane improvement entails mine clearing tanks dragging a variable length of explosive line charge. The charge is detonated to clear mines not uncovered by the plow or roller. Our minefield should be deep enough to preclude the threat from breaching the entire depth with one line charge.

The threat breaching capability with one line charge is curently in the meter range. A threat squad can assemble a meter-long triple charge in 1 to 1. Planners should check the current threat capability for breaching before determining what size minefield is most effective. As with much of threat engineer activity, threat mine and countermine operations provide both intelligence and tactical values to friendly forces.

Minefield breaching activity is indicative of impending threat offensive action, and the identification of such activity will greatly assist in determining times and locations of attack. However, it must be kept in mind that threat doctrine calls for the conduct of bogus mine clearing activity as part of cover and deception plans.

Tactically, the denial of threat countermine actions serves to deprive the threat commander of the tactical initiative which his entire operation plan is based. River crossings Threat military doctrine dictates that, whenever possible, water obstacles along a broad front are crossed at multiple points without pause in the march or the advance. This tactic is designed to rapidly overwhelm enemy defenses and maintain the tempo of the attack.

In the threat view, a delay at a major water obstacle can jeopardize the success of an entire offensive operation in conventional combat, and is certain to destroy large forces massed for the crossing during a nuclear war.

Consequently, the threat recognizes two distinct forms of river crossing, hasty and deliberate. The hasty crossing incorporates the features of rapid movement previously mentioned. The attacking force crosses the water obstacle in stride, does not stop to consolidate bridgeheads, and continues the advance without pausing. This is the preferred form of river crossing. The deliberate crossing is conducted when an attempted hasty crossing has failed, or when hostilities are being initiated against a wellprepared enemy occupying a river line defense.

It is characterized by more detailed planning, extensive buildup and preparation, and a greater degree of centralization than the hasty crossing. While all arms are fully trained in their individual roles in river crossing operations, engineer functions provide the margin of success.

It is not the purpose of this section to examine river crossing operations in their entirety, but to define the role of engineers within the overall effort.

Engineer support to assault river crossings by threat forces occurs in the following areas: Engineer reconnaissance of water.

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Majin The possible adverse effect on the command and the local population, however, must also be taken into account. Forest vegetation is the primary concern in cross-country movement. Engineers in amphibious APCs accompany initial assault waves and assist in reducing defenses on the far bank. Engineer elements are also combined with other branch elements in operational groupings to perform specific tasks. The mission of engineers is to create conditions of movement which will allow this noticeably complicated countetmobility to occur counteemobility, and enable the threat commander to enjoy total tactical initiative while denying it to the enemy.

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